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Dear Prisoners—Be Prepared to be Gawked
at: Other Prisoners Watching You Strip
Naked is Reasonably Related to Penological
Interests, or is it?
Kenzie Ryback*
ABSTRACT
The Fourth Amendment states that citizens have the constitutional
right to privacy, which includes being free from unreasonable searches.
When citizens become prisoners, however, their rights, including their
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches, may be limited.
For example, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of blanket
strip search policies in correctional institutions. The Supreme Court,
however, cautioned that an unreasonably conducted strip search is
unconstitutional if the strip search does not pass the reasonableness test.
Because the Supreme Court has only reviewed cases involving privately
conducted strip searches, the federal circuit and district courts have faced
a new challenge: applying the reasonableness test to non-private, group
strip searches.
A strip search where a naked prisoner is forced to bend over and squat
in front of not only the correctional officer conducting the strip search but
also an audience of other naked prisoners is likely an extremely
humiliating experience. Several courts agree that a wider audience
enhances the invasion of privacy. What the courts have to determine
regarding group strip searches is whether a legitimate penological interest
of a correctional institution outweighs a prisoner’s privacy interests.
This Comment will first examine the case law dealing with group
strip searches. Next, this Comment will argue that courts rely too much on
the correctional officers’ discretion when determining whether a group
strip search advances a legitimate penological interest of the correctional
institution. Finally, this Comment will analyze ways to combat the
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deference and recommend that the Supreme Court formally adopt a “less
invasive alternatives” test when courts balance the needs of the
correctional institution against the privacy interests of the prisoners.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Approximately 2.3 million people are being held in 1,719 state
prisons, 102 federal prisons, 901 juvenile correctional facilities, 3,163
local jails, 80 Indian County jails, and other detention centers and prisons
(collectively referred to as “correctional institutions”) across the United
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States.1 Each year, correctional institutions facilitate roughly 11 million
admissions.2
Once a prisoner arrives at a correctional institution, a correctional
officer (CO) then screens and interviews the prisoner for medical and
security reasons.3 To combat potential security dangers correctional
institutions subject prisoners to invasive strip searches4 as part of the initial
screening, after visits with attorneys and family members, and after shifts
at jobs or upon returning from a court hearing.5 Strip searches are
necessary to maintain the correctional institution’s security and safety by
discovering drugs, weapons, and other prohibited items that prisoners
might smuggle into the correctional institution.6
The Supreme Court held that correctional institutions are
constitutionally permitted to conduct private strip searches if the strip
search is reasonably conducted and related to a legitimate penological
justification.7 Strip searches, however, are not always a private affair
behind closed doors between the COs and the one prisoner being strip
searched.8 What remains unclear is whether strip searching multiple
prisoners at the same time, in full view of each other, or strip searching a
prisoner in a public location is reasonable and related to a legitimate
penological justification, and therefore constitutional.9

1. Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Mar.
14,
2018),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018.html.
2. Id.
3. See Inmates Custody and Care, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS,
https://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_and_care/entering_prison.jsp (last visited Jan. 31,
2019). Correctional institutions are “unique place[s] fraught with serious security dangers.”
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
4. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 330 (2012). Strip search
is defined as “the removal of all clothing and the inspection of all folds of the skin and
exterior parts of the body.” Strip Search, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Desk ed. 2012).
Depending on the jurisdiction, a strip search may include a visual body cavity search. See
Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 561 n.3 (1st Cir. 1985). A visual body cavity search is
the “visual inspection of the anal and genital areas.” Id. “Strip search” as used throughout
this Comment will include a visual body cavity search.
5. See Body Cavity Searches at Michigan’s Women’s Huron Valley Correctional
Facility, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://bit.ly/2G13WOE (last updated Apr. 12,
2012).
6. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
7. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 339; see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
8. See, e.g., Sumpter v. Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 2017); Lewis v. Sec’y of
Pub. Safety & Corr., 870 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2017); Williams v. City of Cleveland (Williams
III), 907 F.3d 924 (6th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 34594 (6th Cir.
Dec. 7, 2018); Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2013); Lopez v.
Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
9. See Farmer v. Perrill, 288 F.3d 1254, 1259 (10th Cir. 2002); see also Crump v.
Passaic Cty., 147 F. Supp. 3d 249, 258 (D.N.J. 2015).
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Group strip searches are particularly more invasive and humiliating
than private strip searches,10 but until the case law develops, the extent of
what penological interests are considered legitimate and reasonable to
prompt the need to conduct a group strip search remains uncertain.11 Until
the Supreme Court draws the line, prisoners are likely to face a legal
system that favors the needs of COs and correctional institutions over
prisoners’ privacy rights.12
This Comment will address group and non-private strip searches and
will seek to synthesize the arguments and rationale that the circuit and
district courts rely on to determine whether a sufficient link exists between
a correctional institution’s group strip search policy or practice and the
needs of the correctional institution.13 Part II of this Comment will discuss
the Supreme Court’s decisions related to the constitutionality of strip
searches.14 Part II will also provide a discussion of the impact of the
Supreme Court’s decisions concerning group and non-private strip
searches on lower courts.15 Part II will conclude with a discussion of lower
court cases that address group strip searches.16
Then, Part III of this Comment will explain the three-step
reasonableness test that lower courts utilize when addressing the
constitutionality of group strip searches.17 Part III will also discuss the
application of a “less invasive alternative” test to challenge the discretion
of COs.18 Lastly, Part III will recommend that the Supreme Court formally
adopt the “less invasive alternative” test to determine whether a group strip
search is unreasonable.19 Finally, Part IV will offer concluding statements
on the issues raised in this Comment.20
II.

BACKGROUND

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that
“[t]he peoples’ right to be secured in their persons . . . against
unreasonable searches . . . shall not be violated.”21 Although the Fourth

10. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 483.
11. See generally Sumpter, 868 F.3d 473; Lewis, 870 F.3d 365; Stoudemire, 705 F.3d
560.
12. See infra Section III.B.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Section II.A.
15. See infra Section II.B.1. “Lower courts,” as used throughout this Comment,
includes both federal district courts and circuit courts.
16. See infra Section II.B.2.
17. See infra Section III.A.
18. See infra Section III.B.
19. See infra Section III.C.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Amendment protects all citizens,22 the Supreme Court established that
prisoners’ Fourth Amendment protections might be limited.23
One such limitation is in the context of strip searches.24 When
confronted with cases premised on Fourth Amendment protections,
courts25 are required to balance the nature of the strip search against the
need for the strip search.26 When applying the reasonableness standard to
claims that challenge a correctional institution’s policies or practices,
courts generally afford deference27 in favor of COs’ penological expertise
and interests.28
A.

Supreme Court Jurisprudence

Applying the Fourth Amendment “reasonableness standard,” the
Supreme Court held in both Bell v. Wolfish29 and Florence v. Board of
Chosen Freeholders30 that strip searches in correctional institutions are
constitutional.31 The Supreme Court in Bell first discussed the
constitutionality of strip searches in correctional institutions in 1979.32 The
prisoners challenged the Bureau of Prisons’ policy33 that permitted COs to

22. See id.
23. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979).
24. See, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012); Bell, 441
U.S. 520; Sumpter v. Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 2017); Lewis v. Sec’y of Pub.
Safety & Corr., 870 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2017).
25. “Courts,” as used throughout this Comment, will include the U.S. Supreme Court,
federal circuit courts, and federal district courts.
26. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 480. Courts do not universally apply a single dictionary
definition of “strip search.” Florence, 566 U.S. at 323. In Florence, the Court noted that
the term “strip search” is itself imprecise. Id. at 325. The Court explained that the term
“strip search” can mean anything from having a prisoner remove clothing while a CO
observes from a distance to instructing a prisoner to make various motions to dislodge
anything that could be on the prisoner’s body. Id. On the extreme end, a strip search may
include a body cavity search. Id. What the term “strip search” actually means depends on
the context in which a court uses the term. Id.
27. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 547; see also infra Section II.B.
28. See, e.g., Florence, 566 U.S. at 323, 328; Bell, 441 U.S. at 546–48; Sumpter, 868
F.3d at 480, 485; Lewis, 870 F.3d at 368; Williams v. City of Cleveland (Williams I), 771
F.3d 945, 950 (6th Cir. 2014); Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 571–72
(6th Cir. 2013); Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1137 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
29. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
30. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012).
31. See id. at 339; see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
32. See generally Bell, 441 U.S. 520.
33. See Searches of Inmates, 28 C.F.R. § 552.11 (2018). The regulation states:
Staff may conduct a visual search where there is a reasonable belief that
contraband may be concealed on the person, or a good opportunity for
concealment has occured [sic]. For example, placement in a special housing
unit . . ., leaving the institution, or re-entry into an institution after contact with
the public . . . is sufficient to justify a visual search. The visual search shall be
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require prisoners “to expose their body cavities for visual inspection as
part of a strip search conducted after every contact visit with a person from
outside the correctional institution.”34 The Court held that the strip search
policy, even without individualized probable cause, did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.35
The Court reasoned that even though the record reflects only one
occurrence where a strip search resulted in confiscating contraband,
minimizing the security dangers to the correctional institution outweighed
the intrusion of the prisoners’ privacy.36 Bell set the standard that strip
searches are constitutional if three factors are deemed “reasonable”: (1)
the manner in which the strip search is conducted, (2) the justification for
initiating the strip search, and (3) the location of the strip search.37
Then, about 30 years later, the Supreme Court decided whether the
seriousness of the offense or an individualized reasonable suspicion were
necessary considerations before conducting strip searches.38 In Florence,
the police arrested the plaintiff because he had an outstanding arrest
warrant for failing to appear at a hearing to enforce a fine.39 The plaintiff
was admitted to one correctional institution and then shortly after that
transferred to a second correctional institution.40 Upon being admitted to
each of these correctional institutions, COs strip–searched the plaintiff.41
The correctional institutions’ blanket strip search policies “applied
regardless of the circumstances of the arrest, the suspected offense, or the
[prisoner’s] behavior, demeanor, or criminal history.”42
After being released from the second correctional institution, the
plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking relief for violations of his Fourth

made in a manner designed to assure as much privacy to the inmate as
practicable.
Id. § 552.11(c)(1).
34. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 558 (noting that the Metropolitan Correctional Center follows
the Bureau of Prisons’ policy); see also Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 578 n.1, 588–
89 (1984) (defining non-contact visits as having a clear glass panel separating prisoners
from visitors, who visit over telephones, and having privacy partitions separating each
individual privacy location; whereas contact visits would allow a limited degree of physical
contact without the glass barrier).
35. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 560 (explaining that the Supreme Court declined to
distinguish pre-trial prisoners from convicted prisoners).
36. See id. at 559 (noting that the lack of occurrences where strip searches resulted in
confiscating contraband may even be a testament that the strip search technique is an
effective deterrent).
37. See id.
38. See generally Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012).
39. See id. at 323.
40. See id. at 323–24.
41. See id. The correctional institutions’ policies were to strip search each prisoner
upon being admitted to the correctional institution. Id.
42. See id. at 324.
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Amendment rights.43 The plaintiff maintained that persons arrested for
minor offenses should not be subjected to the same invasive strip searches,
as part of the routine intake process, as other prisoners arrested for more
serious crimes involving drugs and weapons.44 Alternatively, the plaintiff
suggested that if COs have a particularized suspicion that a prisoner is
concealing contraband, then that prisoner could be strip searched even if
arrested for a minor offense.45
The Court held that COs do not need to consider the seriousness of
an offense when determining whether to strip search a prisoner; therefore,
the correctional institution’s blanket strip search policy struck a reasonable
balance between prisoner privacy and the needs of the correctional
institution.46 The Court’s reasoning in Florence closely mirrored its
reasoning in Bell in that in both cases, the Court focused on ensuring the
correctional institutions’ security.47 Specifically, a new prisoner entering
a correctional institution poses a risk to the correctional institution’s staff
and general prisoner population if COs are not permitted to inspect the
new prisoner’s body for hidden contraband.48 The Court reasoned that
“[w]eapons, drugs, and alcohol all disrupt the safe operation of a
[correctional institution].”49
The Court explained that contraband successfully brought into the
correctional institution creates leverage and power among the prisoners.50
Leverage and power among the prisoners results in a substantial risk for
everyone in the correctional institution.51 To dissipate such a risk, the
Court agreed with the COs’ explanation that security is improved when all
prisoners are required to undergo some type of strip search when entering
the correctional institution.52
Besides discovering hidden contraband, the Court explained other
justifications for conducting a thorough strip search of prisoners as part of
the intake process.53 For example, strip searches are necessary to help
discover and treat any physical injuries and contagious conditions, such as
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 339 (explaining that even though a blanket strip search policy is
constitutional, strip searches conducted in an unreasonable manner may be deemed
unconstitutional).
47. See id. at 328–29; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
48. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 322.
49. See id. at 332.
50. See id. at 333 (explaining that leverage is created by placing value on such
contraband resulting in the prisoners’ own “underground economy”).
51. See id. at 333–34 (explaining that the ultimate goal of COs is to minimize risk for
both the prisoners and the staff in the correctional institution).
52. See id. at 328.
53. See id. at 330.
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lice.54 Additionally, strip searches help identify gang members, allowing
COs to then isolate gang members from one another, which promotes
safety for everyone in the correctional institution.55
Finally, the Court reasoned that if persons arrested on minor offenses
are exempt from strip searches, prisoners may coerce people outside of the
prison to commit minor offenses and smuggle contraband into the
correctional institution without being subjected to a strip search upon
intake.56 Furthermore, upon a prisoner’s arrival at the prison, COs would
only have a few minutes to determine whether the prisoner’s offense was
serious enough to authorize the strip search, which could give rise to
charges of discriminatory application.57 The Court ultimately refused to
accept such an offense-based standard because it would create an
“unworkable standard” for the COs to apply and create unnecessary risk.58
B.

Aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Decisions as Applied to
Group Strip Searches

As a result of the Supreme Court’s holdings in Bell and Florence,
lower courts adopted the “reasonableness test” to apply to group strip
searches.59 In applying the reasonableness test, lower courts must consider
the scope of the particular intrusion, the justification for initiating the
group strip search, and whether the need for the group strip search
outweighed the privacy interests of the prisoners.60
In determining the reasonableness of a strip search, the Supreme
Court advised lower courts to give COs considerable deference when
analyzing whether the manner in which the strip search was conducted
advanced a legitimate penological interest.61 Courts give deference to COs
because correctional institutions are often “crowded [and] unsanitary,”62

54. See id. at 330–31.
55. See id. at 331 (noting markings and tattoos representative of gang affiliations are
often covered up by clothing).
56. See id. at 336.
57. See id. at 337 (explaining that if the CO’s conduct is later deemed discriminatory,
then the CO may be held liable for conducting an improper strip search, and to avoid
potential liability a CO may choose to forgo the strip search).
58. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 334, 338.
59. See infra Section II.B.2.
60. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 327; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
61. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 323, 328; see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 546–48; Sumpter v.
Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 472, 480, 485 (6th Cir. 2017); Lewis v. Sec’y of Pub. Safety & Corr.,
870 F.3d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 2017); Williams I, 771 F.3d 945, 950 (6th Cir. 2014);
Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 571–72 (6th Cir. 2013); Lopez v.
Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1137 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
62. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 333.
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and are “unique place[s] fraught with serious security dangers.”63 COs face
new problems every day without having simple solutions available.64
In Bell, the Court noted that courts should defer to the COs’ judgment
unless substantial evidence is introduced to prove the alleged conduct was
an exaggerated response.65 Although courts may not agree with a
correctional institution’s policies and practices, the Supreme Court
cautioned that COs are better informed than the courts,66 and courts should
not question their judgment unless substantial evidence suggests
otherwise.67 As long as the solution is reasonable and the means are linked
to minimize risk and maximize security and internal order, courts give
great deference to the COs’ judgment.68
1. New Challenges Faced by Lower Courts
Because the Supreme Court decided that strip searches are
constitutional,69 post-Florence prisoners claim that the manner in which
COs conduct strip searches is unreasonable, and therefore, violates their
Fourth Amendment rights.70 The strip searches conducted in Bell and
Florence involved one or two COs strip-searching one prisoner behind
closed doors, where other prisoners or COs could not see the stripsearched prisoner.71
In the aftermath of Bell and Florence, prisoners have challenged the
constitutionality of non-private and group strip searches.72 Group strip
searches involve strip-searching several prisoners simultaneously in an
area where naked prisoners can view the strip searches of other naked
prisoners without any privacy measures in place.73 Non-private means
conducting the strip search in an area where other prisoners or COs not

63. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
64. See id. at 547. “[T]he problems that arise in the day-to-day operation of a
correction[al institution] are not susceptible to easy solutions.” Id. Therefore,
administrators at correctional institutions “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in
the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to
preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Id.
65. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 541 n.23; see also Florence, 566 U.S. at 328.
66. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 544.
67. See id.
68. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 323, 328; see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 546–48; Sumpter v.
Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 472, 480, 485 (6th Cir. 2017); Lewis v. Sec’y of Pub. Safety & Corr.,
870 F.3d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 2017); Williams I, 771 F.3d 945, 950 (6th Cir. 2014);
Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 571–72 (6th Cir. 2013); Lopez v.
Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1137 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
69. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 339; see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
70. See infra Section II.B.2.
71. See generally Florence, 566 U.S. 318; Bell, 441 U.S. 520.
72. See infra Section II.B.2.
73. See Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130–31 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
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part of the strip search can view the strip search.74 Group strip searches
pose a challenge for lower courts when determining whether the
penological interest justifies conducting strip searches in a group as
opposed to privately.75 As of early 2019, the Supreme Court has not
addressed the constitutionality of group strip searches.
2. Prisoner Privacy versus Reasonable Penological Interest Test
Applied by Lower Courts
The issue lower courts address is not whether group strip searches, in
general, are constitutional, but rather whether the need to conduct a group
strip search in the particular case advanced a penological interest that
outweighed the prisoners’ privacy interests.76 Depending on the court and
the context, what is considered a reasonable penological interest varies and
involves a fact-specific, case-by-case determination.77
a. Lower Court Decisions Where the Group Strip Search was
Reasonably Related to a Legitimate Penological Interest
In Lewis v. Secretary of Public Safety & Corrections,78 the Fifth
Circuit considered whether the District Court properly granted defendants’
motion for summary judgment.79 In Lewis, the Garment Factory’s80
practice involved group strip-searching about 10 prisoners at a time.81 The
group was collectively instructed to disrobe and perform various tasks
74. See Daphne Ha, Blanket Policies for Strip Searching Pretrial Detainees: An
Interdisciplinary Argument for Reasonableness, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2721, 2745–46
(2011). “Group strip searches,” as used throughout this Comment includes both group and
non-private strip searches.
75. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 326 (explaining that a correctional institution’s policy
that limits a prisoner’s constitutional rights must be upheld “if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests”); see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 559; infra Section II.B.2.
76. See generally Sumpter v. Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 2017); Lewis v.
Sec’y of Pub. Safety & Corr., 870 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2017); Williams I, 771 F.3d 945 (6th
Cir. 2014); Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2013); Lopez, 609
F. Supp. 2d 1125.
77. See generally Sumpter, 868 F.3d 473; Lewis, 870 F.3d 365; Williams I, 771 F.3d
945; Stoudemire, 705 F.3d 560; Lopez, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125.
78. Lewis v. Sec’y of Pub. Safety & Corr., 870 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2017).
79. See id. at 367; see also Summary Judgment, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Desk ed.
2012) (defining “summary judgment” as a specialized motion where the moving party
seeks judgment on the issue as a matter of law when the issues in the dispute can be decided
without regard to any genuine dispute over a material fact).
80. See Lewis, 870 F.3d at 367 (explaining that prisoners worked at the Garment
Factory which was owned and operated by the Louisiana Department of Corrections and
was located next to a sally-port where supply trucks and civilian drivers enter; the prisoners
at the Garment Factory made clothes and lines and had access to sewing tools and
equipment).
81. See id.
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necessary to search for any hidden contraband on the prisoners’ bodies.82
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s granting of the defendants’
motion for summary judgment and concluded that preventing the
introduction of contraband into the correctional institution and
maintaining security at the correctional institution are legitimate
penological interests.83
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that by conducting the group strip searches
at the Garment Factory, the Garment Factory sought to prevent contraband
from entering the main correctional institution from the prisoners and
outside truck drivers that worked in the Garment Factory.84 The Fifth
Circuit further reasoned that the group strip search policies were used to
prevent prisoners from removing items capable of being used as weapons
from the Garment Factory.85
More recently, in Sumpter v. Wayne County,86 the Sixth Circuit
considered whether the correctional institution’s periodic practice87 of
conducting group strip searches constituted a clearly established Fourth
Amendment violation.88 In Sumpter, most of the group strip searches at
issue took place in the correctional institution’s registry89 and involved
escorting the plaintiff and as many as five women prisoners to a room
where they were all strip-searched at the same time.90 While being strip

82. See id.
83. See id. at 368; see also Lewis v. Chatterson, No. 1:10–CV–00291, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 174076, at *16 (W.D. La. Oct. 7, 2015) (concluding that “[t]he strip search and
body cavity search policies . . . are reasonably related to well know, common-sense,
legitimate penological objectives in prison security”).
84. See Lewis, 870 F.3d at 369.
85. See id. at 367–68 (relying on testimony of COs who participated in the group strip
searches that stated they have “personally found marijuana, stolen clothes, cell phones and
money during the strip searches. . .”); Lewis, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174076, at *16
(concluding that “[u]nder the facts and circumstances of this case, the Garment Factory
searches . . . appear to have been conducted in a reasonable and efficient manner designed
to prevent the transportation by [prisoners] of tools, material for weapons, money, phones,
and garments from the Garment Factory to the main are [sic] of the [correctional
institution]”).
86. Sumpter v. Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 2017).
87. See id. at 483–84. “According to [the correctional institution’s] policy applicable
during plaintiff’s detention, [COs] were to conduct strip searches ‘out of view of the public
and other [prisoners]’’[w]hen possible’” and that “[g]roup [strip] searches were the
exception.” Id.
88. See id. at 478.
89. See id. at 479 (explaining that the group strip searches at issue “occurred in the
[correctional institution’s] [r]egistry, where [prisoners] are routinely searched when first
arriving to the [correctional institution] or returning from a trip outside” and then escorted
to see medical personnel or to be taken to their cellblock).
90. See id. at 479, 484 (noting that the group strip searches of up to five prisoners were
only conducted when there was a line of twenty or more women waiting to be processed
and the high volume of prisoners demanded it).
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searched, the CO made several rude comments about the plaintiff’s body
odor and hygiene.91
The Sixth Circuit held that the group strip searches conducted in the
correctional institution’s registry did not violate a clearly established
Fourth Amendment right.92 The Sixth Circuit explained that addressing the
constitutionality of group strip searches involves a three-step analysis: (1)
determining the nature of the intrusion; (2) evaluating the need for the
search; and (3) determining whether the strip search was reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests.93
First, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that strip searches, as a wellestablished principle, are an extreme invasion of privacy.94 The court
stated that strip searches conducted in front of an audience or in a
discourteous manner enhanced the degree of the invasion of privacy.95 The
registry group strip searches were a significant invasion of the plaintiff’s
privacy because not only was the plaintiff’s naked body visually inspected,
but her naked body was exposed to several other prisoners.96 Because the
group strip searches were “especially” intrusive, step one was satisfied.97
For step two, the Sixth Circuit addressed the penological justification
for conducting the strip search in a group.98 The Sixth Circuit explained
that because the CO conducted the group strip searches in a manner that
was inconsistent with the correctional institution’s policies, the Sixth
Circuit had to determine whether a legitimate penological interest for
deviating from the policy existed.99 The Sixth Circuit relied on the CO’s
judgment that group strip searches, as an expedited process, are necessary
when a high volume of prisoners are awaiting admittance because delays
impact the health of the prisoners and the safety of the correctional
institution.100 The Sixth Circuit concluded that in this case, the need for an
91. See id. at 483 (noting that the CO told the plaintiff that she “smell[ed] like a funky
monkey” and that she “needed to clean herself better”).
92. See id. at 478.
93. See id. at 482 (quoting Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 572 (6th
Cir. 2013)) (explaining that the first step requires “examin[ing] the scope, manner, and
location of the search,” the second step requires giving “due deference to the CO’s exercise
of her discretionary functions,” and the third step requires “weighing the need [for the
search] against the invasion”).
94. See id. at 483.
95. See id.
96. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 483 (citing Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 573) (explaining that
even though the comments about the plaintiff’s body odor and hygiene points to the
“dignity interests” that the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect “against unreasonable
searches,” they “are not dispositive of reasonableness”).
97. See id. (noting that “an intrusive search is not necessarily an unreasonable one,
especially in the corrections setting”).
98. See id.
99. See id. at 484.
100. See id. at 485.
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expedited process was a legitimate penological justification for the CO to
deviate from the policy.101
The Sixth Circuit summarized the first two steps by stating that “on
[the] one hand, the group strip searches . . . were especially intrusive[, but]
on the other hand, [the] defendants . . . asserted a legitimate penological
justification for [the] periodic[]” deviation.102 The Sixth Circuit explained
that typically courts would then weigh the intrusion against the
justification to determine whether the search was unreasonable.103 The
Sixth Circuit, however, declined to do so because the defendants asserted
qualified immunity,104 which did not require the court to complete the
three-step analysis.105
Because the Sixth Circuit recognized that no decision “squarely
govern[ed]” the issue, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the COs had no
reason to be aware that conducting group strip searches was unreasonable
when the volume of prisoners needing processing would make individual
searches imprudent.106 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District
Court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the COs and the
correctional institution.107
b. Lower Court Decisions Where the Group Strip Search was Not
Reasonably Related to a Legitimate Penological Interest
In Sumpter and Lewis, the defendants identified a specific
penological justification for the group strip searches, and the circuit courts
either determined that the penological interest outweighed the prisoners’
privacy interests108 or granted qualified immunity to the defendant.109 In
contrast to Sumpter and Lewis, other lower courts have addressed the issue

101. See id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 485–86 (explaining that qualified immunity protects the CO from
personal liability unless the CO’s alleged conduct violated a clearly established
constitutional right).
105. See id.
106. . See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 486–88 (noting that the Sixth Circuit rejected the
plaintiff’s arguments that there was a right not to be subjected to group strip searches
because the plaintiff’s authorities were not analogous to the case at issue, and the
defendants in those cases failed to provide a legitimate penological interest to weigh against
the particular intrusion); see also Crump v. Passaic Cty., 147 F. Supp. 3d 249, 258 (D.N.J.
2015) (explaining that “[a]bsent controlling authority, a robust consensus of cases of
persuasive authority is required to find that law in question is clearly established[],” and
that “a single decision from another circuit is far from a robust consensus of cases”).
107. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 492.
108. See Lewis v. Sec’y of Pub. Safety & Corr., 870 F.3d 365, 367–69 (5th Cir. 2017).
109. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 485–88.

852

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 123:3

of group strip searches where the defendant did not assert a legitimate
penological justification.110
For example, in Lopez v. Youngblood,111 the correctional institution
had a blanket policy that subjected prisoners to a group strip search
anytime they returned from outside the correctional institution.112 During
the searches, COs strip-searched groups of prisoners in view of each other
and without any partitions or barriers.113 The plaintiffs asserted that the
blanket policy of group strip-searching prisoners constituted a Fourth
Amendment violation.114
The District Court for the Eastern District of California rejected the
defendants’ two main arguments: (1) that the group strip searches were not
excessive or conducted in a harassing manner, and therefore, the severe
personnel limitations and security concerns justified searches in small
groups;115 and (2) that the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that only
privately conducted strip searches are permissible.116 The District Court
held that because the defendants offered no evidence that suggested
alternative methods were not available or that the COs’ safety was a
concern, the blanket group strip search policy violated the Fourth
Amendment.117
First, the District Court reasoned that unlike the authority cited by the
defendants,118 in this case, the defendants did not take any additional steps
110. See, e.g., Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 574 (6th Cir. 2013);
Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1138 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
111. Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
112. See id. at 1130. The strip searches involved a “visual inspection of the
underclothing, female breasts, buttocks, or genitalia of [the prisoner].” Id. The strip
searches also included a visual body cavity search which included the “visual inspection
of the anus and/or vaginal area . . . requiring the prisoners to position themselves in a way
that would expose body cavity orifices.” Id.
113. See id. at 1130–31 (noting that other prisoners who were in view of the strip
searches were also strip searched at the same time).
114. See id. at 1129.
115. See id. at 1134. The District Court rejected the defendants’ argument that limited
space and staffing precluded the ability to conduct individual strip searches because
administrative burden and inconvenience arguments typically do not justify a constitutional
violation. Id.
116. See id. at 1135–37 (distinguishing Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694 (9th Cir.
1997), where “the court confronted a plan to detect contraband targeted to specific inmates,
not a blanket policy permitting group strip searches,” and Michenfeider v. Sumner, 860
F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988), where the group strip search policy was limited to the state’s most
dangerous prisoners, which were housed in the maximum security unit, not a blanket group
strip search policy and the court focused on CO safety and lack of available alternatives).
117. See id. at 1138.
118. See id. at 1134–35 (distinguishing Fernandez v. Rapone, 926 F. Supp. 255 (D.
Mass. 1996), where the group strip searches were not unreasonable because a policy had
been in place where the COs were to comply with a prisoner’s request to be searched alone,
and Zunker v. Bertrand, 798 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D. Wis. 1992), where the group strip
searches were constitutional because the COs and the correctional institution took
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to protect the privacy of the prisoners that would have led the District
Court to conclude that security concerns of the correctional institution
outweighed privacy interests.119 Second, the District Court recognized
situations where a group strip search is warranted to protect the safety of
the COs, but in this case, the defendants did not present any evidence that
the COs safety was a concern.120
Lastly, the District Court acknowledged that the plaintiffs did not
challenge the policy of strip-searching prisoners to discover contraband,
but rather challenged a blanket policy of group strip-searching
prisoners.121 The District Court concluded that the blanket policy was a
Fourth Amendment violation because no evidence proved that group strip
searches are more likely to result in finding contraband than individual
strip searches.122
Prior to Lopez, the Supreme Court had not addressed whether blanket
policies for individual or group strip searches were constitutional. At the
time Lopez was decided, the Supreme Court had only determined that
reasonably conducted strip searches are not a violation of a prisoner’s
Fourth Amendment.123 Three years after Lopez was decided, the Supreme
Court in Florence held that blanket strip search policies are
constitutional.124 Unlike Lopez, which concerned a blanket group strip
search policy, Florence only applied to individual strip search polices, and
the Court declined to carve out exceptions.125 Shortly after the Supreme
Court’s holding in Florence, the Sixth Circuit decided at least two other
cases, in addition to Sumpter,126 that addressed group strip searches.127 The
first was Stoudemire v. Michigan Department of Corrections,128 where a
CO subjected a prisoner, who was waiting for an escort so she could leave
the infirmary’s common area, to a random strip search.129 The CO decided

additional steps to protect the privacy of prisoners by using privacy curtains and obstructing
the view of other prisoners waiting to be searched).
119. See id. at 1135–36.
120. See id. at 1137.
121. See Lopez, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1138.
122. See id. (explaining that individual strip searches would afford prisoners at least
some privacy).
123. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979).
124. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 339 (2012) (explaining
that even though a blanket strip search policy is constitutional, strip searches conducted in
an unreasonable manner may be deemed unconstitutional).
125. See id. at 327-38.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 86-107.
127. See generally Williams III, 907 F.3d 924 (6th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied, 2018 U.S.
App. LEXIS 34594 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2018); Williams I, 771 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2014);
Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2013).
128. Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2013).
129. See id. at 567.
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to conduct the random strip search “because [she could]” and then escorted
the prisoner to her cell to conduct the strip search.130
The Sixth Circuit held the strip search unreasonable131 and applied
the same three-step analysis introduced above in Sumpter.132 First, the
Sixth Circuit recognized that strip searches are inherently invasive133 and
because the CO did not block the window of the cell and the strip search
did not take place in a private location, the degree of invasion was
enhanced.134
Second, the Sixth Circuit stated that the court must assume that the
reason for initiating a strip search was to detect and deter contraband
unless otherwise indicated by the evidence.135 The Sixth Circuit concluded
that even though the CO may have had a valid reason for strip-searching
the prisoner, the record did not demonstrate that exigent circumstances
existed at the time to justify strip–searching the prisoner where others
could see her naked.136 Because no legitimate penological justification for
the strip search existed, the invasiveness of the strip search outweighed the
non-existent penological justifications.137

130. See id. at 566–67 (noting that the prisoner’s cell had a window on the cell door
that looked out onto a busy hallway, the CO did not cover the window even though people
in the hallway could see the strip search being conducted, and the CO conducted the strip
search with a smirk on her face).
131. See id. at 574.
132. See id. at 572 (explaining that first, the Sixth Circuit must determine the degree of
the invasion, second, the Sixth Circuit needs to evaluate the need of the search, giving
deference to the CO’s judgment, and finally, the Sixth Circuit must determine whether the
need for the strip search was reasonably related to a legitimate penological justification);
see also Sumpter v. Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 473, 482 (6th Cir. 2017).
133. See Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 572–73.
134. See id. (explaining that even though the CO did not explain her reasoning to the
prisoner for conducting the strip search, and was smirking while conducting the search,
these elements are not dispositive but add to whether the CO’s conduct made the strip
search somewhat more invasive).
135. See id. at 573 (noting that the second step requires determining the need for the
particular search at issue in the case).
136. See id. at 574 (explaining that additional justifications may include evidence that
an emergency existed, such as a riot situation, evidence that supports that the location was
chosen because other alternatives would have presented a risk to officer safety, evidence
that the prisoner had a history of maladaptive behavior, and evidence of time or resources
constraints); see also Crump v. Passaic Cty., 147 F. Supp. 3d 249, 257 (D.N.J. 2015)
(explaining that there may also be situations where a group strip search may not be a
violation of the Fourth Amendment). For example, where strip searches are conducted in
front of a group because of a lockdown in the correctional institution, the need for safety
and expediency in this type of emergency situation outweighed the consideration of the
prisoner’s privacy. Id. However, this very specific circumstance does not imply that routine
non-private strip searches are reasonable. Id.
137. See Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 574; see also Sumpter v. Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 473,
482 (6th Cir. 2017).
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The second case the Sixth Circuit heard was Williams v. City of
Cleveland.138 Williams addressed whether forgoing the use of less invasive
procedures and subjecting prisoners, as part of the correctional
institution’s policy, to a group strip search upon being processed into the
correctional institution is constitutional.139 The Sixth Circuit had to decide
whether the plaintiffs’ complaint plausibly alleged that the group strip
searches were unreasonable.140 The Sixth Circuit held that because
alternatives were available, the group strip searches were unreasonable.141
The Sixth Circuit’s analysis focused on whether the correctional
institution possessed any readily available alternatives.142 The Sixth
Circuit reasoned that where no reasonable alternatives to the manner in
which the CO conducted the strip search are available, courts will likely
conclude that the conduct was reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest.143 On the other hand, where obvious, easy alternatives
that fully accommodate the needs of the correctional institution are
available, any marginal benefits associated with a more invasive
alternative are likely outweighed by the prisoner’s privacy interests, such
that choosing the more invasive option would be unreasonable.144 The
Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision and remanded for
further proceedings.145
On remand, the District Court had to determine whether exigent
circumstances existed to necessitate strip-searching the prisoners in view
of other prisoners.146 The correctional institution argued that
administrative convenience justified the correctional institution’s blanket
group strip search policy.147 The correctional institution explained that the
policy was necessary because the correctional institution was “busy” and
group strip searches would expedite the process.148 A CO stated, however,

138. Williams I, 771 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2014).
139. See id. at 947 (noting that the case also involved the process of COs spraying the
prisoners’ naked genitals with a delousing solution from a pressurized metal canister).
140. See id.
141. See id. at 954.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 954–55.
144. See id.
145. See id. (explaining that because the Sixth Circuit heard the case on appeal at the
motion to dismiss phase, the Sixth Circuit did not determine whether the group strip
searches were unreasonable, rather only decided whether the complaint plausibly alleged
that the defendants’ conduct was unreasonable).
146. See Williams v. City of Cleveland (Williams II), 210 F. Supp. 3d 897, 906 (N.D.
Ohio 2016), rev’d and remanded, 907 F.3d 924 (6th Cir. 2018).
147. See id. at 907.
148. See id.
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that individually strip-searching each prisoner could easily be done and
would only slow the process “a little bit.”149
Accordingly, the District Court held that the manner in which the CO
conducted the group strip searches violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth
Amendment rights.150 The District Court enjoined the defendants from
conducting group strip searches and concluded that the defendants could
perform strip searches individually or in groups with installed privacy
partitions.151 The privacy partitions would allow the unclothed prisoners
to be observed by the CO while obstructing the view of other unclothed
prisoners also being searched.152
After the District Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs’,
the defendants appealed to the Sixth Circuit seeking reversal of the District
Court’s decision.153 The Sixth Circuit first analyzed the issue as to whether
the District Court’s grant of a permanent injunction was proper in relation
to the named plaintiff’s standing to sue.154 Here, the plaintiff did not file
the lawsuit until after leaving the correctional institution.155 As a result, the
Sixth Circuit ultimately vacated the permanent injunctions because the
plaintiff did not have standing to sue, meaning, she did not have a
“‘personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ at the outset of
litigation.”156
In the first appeal, the Sixth Circuit decided whether the plaintiff’s
second amended complaint set forth a plausible claim upon which relief
could be granted.157 In the subsequent appeal, the Sixth Circuit had to
decide, based on undisputed facts, whether the defendant executed a policy
that violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.158 In this second

149. See id. at 907–08.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 908; see also Crump v. Passaic Cty., 147 F. Supp. 3d 249, 256 (citing
Florence v. Bd. of Chose Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 330–33 (2012)) (explaining how even
though Florence emphasized how visual strip searches can contribute to institutional
security and sanitation, a non-private strip search does not contribute to security and
sanitation any more than a private strip search does).
153. See Williams III, 907 F.3d 924, 928 (6th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied, 2018 U.S. App.
LEXIS 34594 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2018).
154. See id. at 932–34.
155. See id. at 933.
156. Id. (quoting Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 922 (6th Cir.
1988)). In cases involving prisoners, unless prisoners file a lawsuit before leaving the
correctional institution, courts “assume the plaintiff would follow the law in the future and
thus avoid exposure to potential searches.” Id. (citing Sumpter v. Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d
473, 491 (6th Cir. 2017)). Here, even though Ms. Williams did in fact return to the
correctional institution three times since filing the lawsuit at issue in this case, “the relevant
inquiry is whether she had a live, actionable claim for relief at the time she filed suit.” Id.
157. See id. at 935.
158. See id.
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appeal, the plaintiff had to demonstrate that the correctional institution
acted unreasonably in conducting the group strip searches.159
The Sixth Circuit noted that while the correctional institution had a
“long-time policy of conducting group strip searches during the intake
process . . . groups of two or three [prisoners] were only strip searched
together in circumstances when large numbers of [prisoners] were waiting
to be processed.”160 The Sixth Circuit, relying on their decision in Sumpter,
concluded that even though individual strip searches were possible, the
need for the search was one of expediency to avoid significant delays.161
Being expedient and avoiding significant delays promotes safety and
addressing health problems as quickly as possible.162 Ultimately, because
the plaintiff did “not provid[e] evidence questioning the legitimacy of the
[defendant’s] proffered justification[,]” the Sixth Circuit reversed the
District Court’s decision and remanded with instructions to grant summary
judgment in favor of the defendants.163
After Bell, Florence, and several of the lower courts decisions, the
only articulable “rule” is that group strip searches should not be a part of
everyday practice or permitted under a blanket policy. But even that
articulation is not wholly accurate. After reading the lower court decisions,
a blanket group strip search policy is arguably constitutional with the
installation of privacy curtains or similar privacy measures.164 On the other
hand, group strip searches are arguably only reasonable in limited
circumstances or as a rarely used exception to individual strip searches.165
Without a uniform rule to help courts and correctional institutions
determine whether a particular group strip search is reasonable, prisoners
will continue to be deprived of their dignity and fundamental right of
privacy. To ensure that prisoners are being treated equally across all
jurisdictions, courts should apply the “less invasive alternative test” to
determine if a group strip search was “reasonable.”166

159. See id. at 934-35.
160. Id. at 936.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 932, 936.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 108–22; see also supra notes 118–20, 136 and
accompanying text.
165. Riot situations, emergencies, and other exigent circumstances would justify the
need to conduct group strip searches rather than taking less invasive measures. See Sumpter
v. Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 473, 498 (6th Cir. 2017) (Clay, J., dissenting); Stoudemire v.
Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 573-74 (6th Cir. 2013).
166. See infra Section III.C.
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ANALYSIS

In Florence, the Supreme Court upheld a correctional institution’s
blanket strip search policy that subjected all prisoners to strip searches
after returning from outside the correctional institution or from contact
visits.167 The correctional institution argued that a blanket strip search
policy was necessary to ensure the security and safety of all persons inside
the correctional institution.168 Even though the blanket strip search policy
in Florence was ultimately deemed constitutional, the Supreme Court
cautioned that strip searches conducted in an unreasonable manner might
be unconstitutional, and that such a determination requires a fact-specific
analysis.169
A.

Three-Step Reasonableness Analysis that Lower Courts
Utilize to Address the Constitutionality of Group Strip
Searches in Correctional Institutions

In addressing group strip searches, lower courts perform a three-step
analysis: (1) determining the nature of the intrusion; (2) evaluating the
need for the search; and (3) determining whether the strip search was
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.170 The first step
requires that courts examine the scope of the privacy invasion, the manner
in which the search was conducted, and the location of the search.171 When
analyzing the second step, and evaluating the need for the search, courts
give deference to the CO’s discretion, based on the specific
circumstances.172 The third step requires that courts weigh the need for the
group strip search against the prisoners’ privacy interests to determine
whether the group strip search was related to a legitimate penological
interest.173
When lower courts have addressed group strip searches, the focus of
the analysis has been on the third step.174 When analyzing the first step,
courts start with the basic presumption that a strip search, even a private
strip search, is inherently an invasion of privacy.175 Several lower courts
167. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 322, 339 (2012).
168. See id. at 333–34.
169. See id. at 329–30, 339; see also Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 483 n.3.
170. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 482; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979);
Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 572 (6th Cir. 2013).
171. See, e.g., Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 482; Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 572.
172. See, e.g., Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 482; Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 572.
173. See, e.g., Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 482; Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 572.
174. See, e.g., Williams III, 907 F.3d 924, 935–36 (6th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied, 2018
U.S. App. LEXIS 34594 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2018); Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 571–74; Lopez
v. Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1134–39 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
175. See, e.g., Bell, 441 U.S. at 559–60; Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 572–73.
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have agreed that a group strip search is an enhanced invasion of privacy
as compared to a private strip search.176 After relying on these general
principles, courts move on to the next step, which is evaluating the need
for the particular group strip search.177
Concerning strip searches generally, discovering contraband to
maintain safety and security at a correctional institution has been
considered a legitimate justification for conducting strip searches.178 In
some situations, if COs do not provide a justification, courts will assume
that discovering contraband was the reason unless proven otherwise.179
But the need to discover contraband cannot be a one-size-fits-all
justification.
Lower courts spend the majority of their analysis trying to determine
whether the need to conduct the group strip search was reasonably related
to a legitimate penological interest.180 In other words, lower courts must
decide if the need to conduct the group strip search outweighs the
prisoner’s right to privacy.181
B.

The Scale is Tipped in the Correctional Institution’s Favor
Even Before the Prisoner Files a Lawsuit

Step three of the analysis requires courts to weigh the prisoners’
privacy interests against the needs of the correctional institution.182 When
evaluating the need for the strip search, courts have admitted that
deference is given to COs because the courts are not experts on what is
necessary to maintain safety and security in a correctional institution, even
if courts do not agree with the method.183 Several courts agree that
maintaining safety and security at a correctional institution is a top
priority.184

176. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 483; Williams I, 771 F.3d 945, 953 (6th Cir. 2014);
Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 574; Crump v. Passaic Cty., 147 F. Supp. 3d 249, 256 (D.N.J.
2015).
177. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559; Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 573.
178. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 326 (2012).
179. See Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 573; see also Lopez, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1137.
180. See, e.g., Williams III, 907 F.3d 924, 935–36 (6th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied, 2018
U.S. App. LEXIS 34594 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2018); Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 571–74; Lopez,
609 F. Supp. 2d at 1134–39 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
181. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 327.
182. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 483.
183. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 326; see also Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 480–81; Stoudemire,
705 F.3d at 571–72; Young v. Cty. of Cook, 616 F. Supp. 2d 834, 847 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
184. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 333–34; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546
(1979); Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 481; Lewis, 870 F.3d at 369; Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 573.
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1. Courts Give Correctional Officers Too Much Deference
In the brief history of cases that have dealt with group strip searches,
the prisoners usually prevailed where the CO did not provide a penological
justification or, at least, did not provide a reasonable justification.185 If no
penological justification is provided, one court suggested that the court
should assume that a strip search was conducted to find contraband unless
evidence indicates otherwise.186 Because the courts rely so heavily on the
COs’ discretion, prisoners have the additional burden of disproving the
presumption that the strip search was conducted to find contraband.187
Prisoners must disprove the presumption, even when no penological
justification is provided.188
COs cannot provide vague, generic explanations as to why
conducting a group strip search was necessary.189 One court suggested that
the need to conduct a group strip search must be “unusually dire” before
that need can outweigh the privacy interests of the prisoners.190 Prisoners
might have a valid constitutional claim if the justification, or lack thereof,
for the group strip search does not validate the CO’s actions. 191 Courts
should not merely rely on the CO’s opinion without first hearing the full
extent of the circumstances surrounding the group strip search.192 Then,
after being fully informed, courts should decide whether the prisoner is
raising a valid constitutional claim.193
COs might have a valid penological interest in conducting strip
searches in general, but COs must have an additional justification to
conduct group strip searches without taking extra steps to ensure some

185. See Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 574; see also Lopez, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1138.
186. See Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 573; see also Lopez, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1137.
187. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 484; see also Lewis, 870 F.3d at 369.
188. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 484; see also Lewis, 870 F.3d at 369.
189. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 497 (Clay, J., dissenting) (noting that a “blanket
explanation that whenever the county jail has to process a lot of female [prisoners], they
can be publicly strip searched in groups, cannot be justified”).
190. See Williams I, 771 F.3d 945, 954 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Florence, 566 U.S. at
327).
191. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 495 (Clay, J., dissenting) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78, 84 (1987)) (“[T]he Supreme Court has instructed that ‘federal courts must take
cognizance of the valid constitutional claims of prison[ers].’”); see also Williams III, 907
F.3d 924, 936 (6th Cir. 2018) (reversing the District Court’s decision to grant the plaintiff
summary judgment because the plaintiff did not “provid[e] evidence questioning the
legitimacy of the [defendant’s] proffered justification”), reh’g denied, 2018 U.S. App.
LEXIS 34594 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2018).
192. See Young v. Cty. of Cook, 616 F. Supp. 2d 834, 847 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
193. See id. (explaining that even though deference is given to the COs’ expertise,
“[COs] are still obliged to present evidence in support of their blanket strip search policy”).
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privacy.194 Some other justifications that have generally been accepted by
the lower courts involve riot situations, emergencies, and exigent
circumstances that would justify the need to conduct group strip searches
rather than taking less invasive measures.195
Courts give deference to the COs’ judgments, but courts should also
scrutinize such judgments. Scrutinizing the COs’ judgments would ensure
that the penological justifications were the justifications at the time the
search was conducted and not the justifications fabricated as a result of a
prisoner filing a lawsuit.196 Prisoners do not necessarily retain all rights
while incarcerated, but prisoners are still human beings, and their dignity
should be protected.197
If COs cannot prove that conducting group strip searches contributed
to the purpose for the strip search any more than a private strip search
would have, then the COs likely acted with a lack of regard for the
prisoners’ privacy rights.198 Unless either courts or prisoners challenge
deference, courts are likely to find that the penological interest justified
the need to conduct the group strip searches, even if that results in the
violation of the prisoners’ Fourth Amendment rights.199
2. How Prisoners Can Rebut Such Deference
When courts give COs such deference, prisoners are already working
from behind before even filing a lawsuit. Not only do prisoners have to
prove the CO’s conduct violated a clearly established Fourth Amendment
right, but prisoners must also prove the group strip search was not
conducted to find contraband.200 As discussed below, presenting evidence
that challenges the justification for the group strip search,201 or presenting
194. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 482; see also Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705
F.3d 560, 573–74 (6th Cir. 2013); Williams II, 210 F. Supp. 3d 897, 906 (N.D. Ohio 2016),
rev’d and remanded, 907 F.3d 924 (6th Cir. 2018).
195. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 498 (Clay, J., dissenting); see also Stoudemire, 705 F.3d
at 573–74.
196. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 492 (Clay, J., dissenting); see also Williams I, 771 F.3d
945, 951–52 (6th Cir. 2014) (explaining that a CO’s statement that there was a legitimate
penological justification for conducting the strip search “does not conclude the [court’s]
inquiry”).
197. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 495, 497 (Clay, J., dissenting) (stating that COs “must
be held to a certain standard of human decency and civility” and the group strip searches
at issue “were carried out according to the subjective and arbitrary whims of the [CO]”);
Williams I, 771 F.3d at 953 (quoting Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir.
2005)).
198. See Crump v. Passaic Cty., 147 F. Supp. 3d 249, 256 (D.N.J. 2015).
199. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 484; see also Lewis v. Sec’y of Pub. Safety & Corr., 870
F.3d 365, 369 (5th Cir. 2017).
200. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 481; see also Crump, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 256. But see
Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1138 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
201. See infra Section III.B.2.a.
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evidence that a less invasive alternative to the group strip search was
available, may be sufficient for prisoners to prove the group strip search
was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.202
a. Challenge the Penological Justification
Group strip searches may be necessary in some situations to maintain
safety and security at the correctional institution.203 On the flip side,
however, general assertions of limited space and resources have not been
upheld as adequate penological justifications.204 To challenge COs’
discretion, prisoners must provide substantial evidence that proves that the
CO’s decision to group strip search the prisoners was an exaggerated
response to the circumstances that prompted the need for a strip search.205
Because courts rely on the CO’s deference, however, courts will not doubt
the CO’s discretion absent a valid reason to do so.206
If prisoners can provide evidence that a group strip search was
calculated harassment or conducted with evil intent, the prisoners may
have a better chance of rebutting the penological justifications.207
Alternatively, prisoners can challenge the penological justification by
offering evidence that proves that a less invasive alternative was available
other than conducting a group strip search.208
b. Less Invasive Alternatives Test
The Supreme Court expressly rejected the “least restrictive
alternative” test;209 however, what the Supreme Court did deem a factor to
consider is whether at the time of the group strip search there was a less
invasive alternative.210 The correctional institution is not required to
employ the least invasive alternative, but rather, when less invasive

202. See infra Section III.B.2.b.
203. See supra Section III.B.2.
204. See Lopez, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1136–37.
205. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 481; Crump, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 256; but see Lopez, 609
F. Supp. 2d at 1138.
206. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 484; see also Lewis v. Sec’y of Pub. Safety & Corr., 870
F.3d 365, 369 (5th Cir. 2017); Farmer v. Perrill, 288 F.3d 1254, 1261 (10th Cir. 2002).
207. See Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 571 (6th Cir. 2013); see
also Lopez, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1134.
208. See Farmer, 288 F.3d at 1258.
209. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90–91 (1987) (explaining that “[COs] do not
have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of
accommodating the [prisoner’s] constitutional complaint” however, the existence of
alternatives may be evidence that the correctional institution’s policy is an exaggerated
response to the problem).
210. See id.; see also Williams I, 771 F.3d 945, 954–55 (6th Cir. 2014); Farmer, 288
F.3d at 1260-61; Crump, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 256.
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alternatives could have been utilized to obtain the same objective as the
group strip search at little or no cost to the correctional institution, the need
to conduct a group strip search is likely to be deemed unreasonable.211
Proof of less invasive alternatives that would adequately accommodate the
needs of the correctional institution strengthens the prisoners’ position.
Not only does such evidence prove that the penological interest did not
necessitate conducting a group strip search, but such evidence also proves
the group strip search was an exaggerated response.212
For example, in Sumpter, the majority concluded that because the
prisoner did not refute the penological justifications, the majority accepted
the penological justifications as valid.213 On the contrary, the dissent
suggested that to address the CO’s health and safety concerns, instead of
conducting group strip searches, the prisoners with medical cards could
have been searched one at a time before processing the prisoners without
medical cards.214 Therefore, the CO’s timing problem would be solved,
and thus, the strip searches could have been less invasive and embarrassing
for the prisoners.215
In addition, unless circumstances such as a riot, emergency, or some
other exigency arise, the most obvious alternative is to conduct individual
strip searches.216 One alternative may be the installation and utilization of
privacy curtains or partitions.217 Correctional institutions could adopt a

211. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 497 (Clay, J., dissenting); see also Williams III, 907 F.3d
924, 938 (6th Cir. 2018) (White, J., dissenting in part) (stating that the plaintiff “established
through substantial evidence that there are obvious, easy alternatives to [defendant’s]
policy of strip-searching [prisoners] in the presence of other female [prisoners]”), reh’g
denied, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 34594 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2018).
212. See Williams II, 210 F. Supp. 3d 897, 908 (N.D. Ohio 2016), rev’d and remanded,
907 F.3d 924 (6th Cir. 2018); see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. “Evidence of the regulation’s
impropriety exists when ‘there are ready alternatives available to the regulations in
question that fully accommodate the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid
penological interests,’ that go untapped.” Williams III, 907 F.3d at 938 (White, J.,
dissenting in part) (citing Spies v. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398, 404 (6th Cir. 1999)).
213. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 484.
214. See id. at 497 (Clay, J., dissenting).
215. See id.
216. See Williams I, 771 F.3d 945, 955 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Williams II, 210 F.
Supp. 3d at 907 (noting that a lieutenant “admitted that, while it may ‘slow things down
just a little bit,’ the detainees could easily be strip searched individually versus as part of a
group”).
217. See Williams II, 210 F. Supp. 3d at 908; see also Young v. Cty. of Cook, 616 F.
Supp. 2d 834, 840 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (noting that the defendants’ expert was unaware of any
other jails that have conducted group strip searches without privacy dividers in the last
twenty years); Williams III, 907 F.3d 924, 938-39 (6th Cir. 2018) (White, J., dissenting)
(explaining that in response to several lawsuits on the issue of group strip searches the Ohio
Corrections Officer Basic Training Manual states that the “search area should provide
privacy from outside observation[:] 1. [m]odesty panels are inexpensive and effective[;
and] 2. [u]se of these panels demonstrates good faith of a department to conduct searches
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policy that requires COs to adhere to any requests by prisoners to be
privately strip–searched rather than subject to a group strip search.218 One
court even suggested that prohibiting contact visits would be a less
invasive alternative.219 When these alternatives are available, but not
utilized, lower courts should be hesitant to decide that the penological
interest justified the need to conduct a group strip search.220
C.

Recommendation

Prisoners face a particular challenge when alleging that group strip
searches are unconstitutional because little case law on the issue exists.221
The rule derived from Florence is that strip searches are constitutional if
they are reasonably conducted and a legitimate penological justification
outweighs the prisoner’s right to privacy.222 In Florence, the Supreme
Court declined to carve out potential exceptions to the rule223 and did not
consider the rule’s application to group strip searches.224 Furthermore, the
Court instructed lower courts to give deference to the discretion of the COs
when determining whether a strip search is reasonably related to a
legitimate penological interest.225
Such deference has tipped the scale in favor of COs even before
prisoners file lawsuits.226 The Supreme Court is in the best position to
ensure that prisoners and correctional institutions’ interests are balanced
on an even scale. The Supreme Court should formally adopt the use of the
less invasive alternative test when determining whether the need to
conduct a group strip search was reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest.227 Requiring courts to use the less invasive alternative
test analysis will ensure COs’ justifications were, at the time of the search,
legitimate, rather than self-serving, and protect the already limited rights
that prisoners retain while incarcerated.
in a constitutional manner”), reh’g denied, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 34594 (6th Cir. Dec. 7,
2018).
218. See Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1135 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing
Fernandez v. Rapone, 926 F. Supp. 255 (D. Mass. 1996)).
219. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 n.40 (1979).
220. See Williams I, 771 F.3d at 950, 954; see also Crump v. Passaic Cty., 147 F. Supp.
3d 249, 256 (D.N.J. 2015).
221. See Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 568 (6th Cir. 2013); see
also Crump, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 258.
222. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 339 (2012); see also
Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 571.
223. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 338; see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 559; Williams I, 771 F.3d
at 951; Crump, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 258.
224. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 338–39.
225. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 547.
226. See infra Section III.B.
227. See infra Section III.B.2.b.
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The cases that discuss group strip searches imply that blanket group
strip search policies that are part of the daily practices of the correctional
institution are likely unconstitutional.228 But where is the line drawn
between a group strip search being reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest and violating the prisoners’ right to privacy? Group
strip searches in situations like emergencies, riots, and lockdowns are
unavoidable,229 and thus, a clear safety issue exists.
How far can the correctional institutions go beyond group stripsearching two to three prisoners when the intake area gets “busy” or a
group of 10 prisoners before leaving a garment factory? The prisoner, or
former prisoner, with limited resources is required to challenge the
judgments of the COs which courts give practically unchecked deference,
but the correctional institution is not required to explain why the
installation of modesty panels could not be accomplished.230 Determining
where the line should be drawn concerning the number of prisoners that
can be strip-searched at once is likely too fact-specific to establish a bright
line rule. Alternatively, however, requiring consideration or
implementation of less invasive alternatives—modesty panels, policies
where prisoners may request a private search, policies where prisoners
with medical cards are searched first—before conducting a group strip
search is likely an easier standard to apply.
A declaration by the Supreme Court, requiring the use of the less
invasive alternative test, would help guide the lower courts’ analysis of the
third step: balancing the need to conduct a group strip search against the
correctional institution’s penological interests. Because alternatives that
afford prisoners some privacy are available and would meet the same goal
as conducting the group strip search at little to no cost, group strip
searches, absent exigent circumstances, should be held as unreasonable
and unconstitutional.231
IV.

CONCLUSION

Lower courts have applied the three-step analysis established by the
Supreme Court when determining the reasonableness of group strip
searches.232 The three-step analysis requires: (1) determining the nature of
the intrusion; (2) evaluating the need for the search; and (3) determining
228. See Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (E.D. Cal. 2009); see also infra
Section II.B.2.
229. See Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 57273 (6th Cir. 2013); see
also Crump v. Passaic Cty., 147 F. Supp. 3d 249, 257 (D.N.J. 2015).
230. See Williams III, 907 F.3d 924, 939 (6th Cir. 2018) (White, J., dissenting), reh’g
denied, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 34594 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2018).
231. See Williams I, 771 F.3d 945, 954–55 (6th Cir. 2014).
232. See supra Section II.B.
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whether the strip search was reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests.233 When conducting the analysis, most courts have concluded
that with respect to group strip searches, steps one and two are wellestablished and are non-issues.234
Correctional institutions are “unique place[s] fraught with serious
security dangers.”235 To combat these risks and dangers, the COs face
situations that do not have simple solutions.236 Because the courts are not
experts on the situations COs face in correctional institutions, courts rely
on the COs’ instincts and discretion when evaluating the need for the
search.237 Courts, however, should not blindly rely on the COs’ discretion.
Prisoners need to challenge and provide evidence that undermines the
COs’ discretion.238 The Supreme Court should formally adopt the use of
the “less invasive alternative” test to analyze whether the need to conduct
a group strip search was reasonably related to a legitimate penological
interest.239 In most situations, if less invasive alternatives are available,
courts should deem the group strip search unconstitutional.240
Even though the Supreme Court in Florence concluded that blanket
strip search policies are constitutional, the Court also emphasized that the
manner in which the search is conducted could render the search
unconstitutional.241 Protection of prisoners’ dignity is the responsibility of
the COs, and the deference afforded to the COs should reflect this
responsibility when deciding whether the group strip search was
reasonably justified.242 Prisoners have limited rights, but that does not
mean they forfeited all of their freedoms.243

233. See Sumpter v. Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 473, 482 (6th Cir. 2017); see also
Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 572; Farmer v. Perrill, 288 F.3d 1254, 1259–60 (10th Cir. 2002).
234. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 483; see also Williams I, 771 F.3d at 953; Crump, 147
F. Supp. 3d at 256–57.
235. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
236. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 547; Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 481.
237. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 326 (2012); see also
Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 480–81; Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 571–72; Farmer, 288 F.3d at 1260;
Young v. Cty. of Cook, 616 F. Supp. 2d 834, 847 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
238. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 484; see also Lewis v. Sec’y of Pub. Safety & Corr., 870
F.3d 365, 369 (5th Cir. 2017); Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 573; Farmer, 288 F.3d at 1261.
239. See supra Section III.C.
240. See Williams III, 907 F.3d 924, 938–39 (6th Cir. 2018) (White, J., dissenting),
reh’g denied, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 34594 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2018).
241. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 338; see also Williams I, 771 F.3d 945, 951–52 (6th Cir.
2014).
242. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 495, 497 (Clay, J., dissenting); see also Williams I, 771
F.3d at 953 (citing Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2005)).
243. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 481; see also Williams I, 771 F.3d at 945, 950;
Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 572; Farmer, 288 F.3d at 1259.

